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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2439
___________
G. S. & S. S. O/B/O B.S.,
Appellants
v.
CRANBURY TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-00774)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 2, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES AND WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 8, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
G.S. and S.S. (the “Parents”), on behalf of their minor son, B.S., appeal
from the District Court‟s order granting summary judgment on the administrative record
in favor of the Cranbury Township Board of Education (“Cranbury”). For the following
reasons, we will affirm.

I.
A.
The claims at issue in this case arise under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (the “IDEA”), which requires states to provide a “free appropriate public
education” (“FAPE”) to each disabled child between the ages of three and twenty-one.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). States meet this requirement by creating for each
disabled student an “individualized education plan” (“IEP”), which sets out a “package of
special educational and related services designed to meet the unique needs of the disabled
child.” Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). To satisfy the IDEA, an IEP must be “„reasonably
calculated‟ to enable the child to receive „meaningful educational benefits‟ in light of the
student‟s „intellectual potential.‟” Shore Reg‟l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d
194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
Parents who believe that a public school is not providing a FAPE may
unilaterally remove their disabled child from that school, place him in another school,
and seek tuition reimbursement for the cost of the alternate placement. 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep‟t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985). A
court may grant tuition reimbursement if the school district failed to provide the required
FAPE and the parents sought an appropriate private placement. Lauren W. v.
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DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., -- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2492 (2009).
B.
B.S. is a fifteen-year-old student who is eligible for special education and
related services under the IDEA. According to his parents, B.S. has multiple handicaps
including pervasive developmental disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
sensory integration difficulties, tendency towards preoccupation, and obsessivecompulsive tendencies. B.S. is also short for his age, which generally makes it difficult
for him to adjust to his surroundings.
B.S. attended the Cranbury School from second through eighth grades,
during which time he was enrolled in some mainstream courses, but also received various
educational accommodations. In eighth grade, for example, B.S. attended algebra and
French in the general education setting, science with in-class support, replacement
English and social studies, speech as a related service, physical therapy, and adaptive
physical education.
In 2008, the Child Study Team (“CST”) at Cranbury began to consider high
school placements for B.S. in anticipation of his eighth-grade graduation in June 2009.
After considering numerous placements, the Cranbury CST proposed to transition B.S.
into the mainstream Princeton High School. On January 29, 2009, the Parents, members
of the Cranbury CST, and a member of the Princeton CST conducted an Individualized
Education Plan (“IEP”) High School Review meeting. The IEP recommended that B.S.
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receive replacement English by a special education teacher during his freshman year at
Princeton, but that he receive the state core curriculum, with certain accommodations, in
all other areas. The IEP also recommended in-class speech language services as well as
continued participation in a social skills group on a pull-out basis. In addition, the IEP
provided for an aide at Princeton to assist B.S. with transition periods and organizational
skills, and to facilitate social interactions with peers.
The Parents disagreed with the recommendations in the IEP and indicated
that they wanted their son to attend the Lewis School, a private school in Princeton, New
Jersey, instead. In fact, it appears that the Parents had actually already entered into a
contract with the Lewis School well before the issuance of the IEP. The Cranbury CST
did not, however, view the Lewis School as a viable option for B.S. because, among other
reasons, B.S.‟s participation in an extended school year (“ESY”) program there in 2008
was problematic.1
At some point after meeting with Cranbury and receiving a copy of the IEP,
the Parents filed a request for a due process hearing to challenge the IEP. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f). At the hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), the Parents
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The ALJ found that the fact that the Parents had entered into a contract with the Lewis
School prior to the IEP meeting, and had not disclosed that fact to Cranbury,
demonstrated a lack of good faith in their “attempt[] to pursue an appropriate placement
for B.S.” (DA129.) The District Court noted that, although parents must demonstrate
that they acted in good faith in order to obtain reimbursement, see Lascari v. Bd. of Educ.
of Ramapo Indian Hills Reg‟l High Sch. Dist., 560 A.2d 1180, 1191 (N.J. 1989), it need
not reach that issue here in light of its finding that the IEP was, in any event, appropriate
under the IDEA.
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claimed that B.S.‟s needs would not be met at Princeton High School, and urged
placement at the Lewis School.2 In support of their position, the Parents presented expert
testimony by Dr. Margaret J. Kay, who had conducted an independent educational
evaluation (“IEE”) of B.S. In her report, Dr. Kay explained that, due to his
developmental disorder, B.S. needed accommodations such as a predictable schedule;
small, structured classes; organization skills monitored on a daily basis; extended time to
complete assignments; oral tests in lieu of written examinations; and frequent breaks
from reading and writing activities. Dr. Kay opined that Princeton High School was not
an appropriate placement for B.S. because it could not provide all of these
accommodations. According to Dr. Kay, the Lewis School was a better fit. For its part,
Cranbury provided testimony by B.S.‟s case manager at Cranbury, the Cranbury CST
supervisor and speech and language therapist, one of B.S.‟s teachers who was also a
member of the IEP team, and the special education supervisor at Princeton, all of whom
stated that B.S.‟s needs could be met at Princeton High School.
After considering testimony from both sides and reviewing all of the
evidence, the ALJ found that the IEP provided B.S. a FAPE at Princeton High School in
accordance with the IDEA. Specifically, the ALJ found that:
[T]he proposed IEP sets forth specific goals and objectives and
identifies various, personalized accommodations in order to provide for the
needs of B.S. and reflects a high degree of sensitivity to his needs and an
awareness of his strengths and weaknesses.
In the process, the
2

The parties attended a mediation session in May 2009 but were unable to reach
agreement.
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determination to place him at Princeton High School represents a
comprehensive collaboration between both the sending district and the
receiving district as B.S. was positioned to transition out of the eighth
grade. Regretfully, however, the parents failed to provide them with the
opportunity to execute on that plan and their decision [to unilaterally place
B.S. at the Lewis School] was inappropriate and contrary to a good faith
effort to work on a realistic, reasonable solution for the benefit of B.S.,
notwithstanding their professed fears regarding his ability to acclimate in
such a setting in that regard. Thus, I am not convinced that the trepidations
expressed by the parents have been corroborated by a preponderance of the
credible evidence. Rather, the district appears to have been totally
responsive and receptive to addressing and/or accommodating the needs of
this young man as he continues to exhibit growth and development during
these critical formative years in his life.
(DA133.) Because the ALJ found that Cranbury had met its obligations under the IDEA,
he concluded that Cranbury was not obligated to reimburse the Parents for tuition,
transportation, or other costs associated with their unilateral placement of B.S. at the
Lewis School.
In February 2010, the Parents brought an action in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey challenging the administrative decision.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which the court construed as requests
to decide the case on the administrative record. See Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d
1045, 1052 (7th Cir. 1997). In a carefully reasoned 34-page opinion, the District Court
upheld the ALJ‟s decision in its entirety, finding that Cranbury had complied with the
IDEA‟s procedural requirements and that its IEP was reasonably calculated to enable
B.S. to receive educational benefits. Accordingly, the District Court entered judgment in
Cranbury‟s favor. The parents now appeal from the District Court‟s order.
6

II.
We have jurisdiction to review the District Court‟s final order pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 265. A district court considering an IDEA
claim makes its own findings under a “modified de novo” standard, whereby it affords
“due weight” to the administrative findings. Id. at 266. We exercise plenary review of a
district court‟s legal conclusions, but review the court‟s factual findings for clear error.
Id. “[T]he issue of whether an IEP is appropriate is a question of fact.” P.P. v. W.
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734-35 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
When parents challenge a school‟s provision of a FAPE to a child, a
reviewing court must (1) consider whether the school district complied with IDEA‟s
procedural requirements and (2) determine whether the educational program was
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Bd. of Educ.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). To be appropriate under the IDEA, an IEP
must provide “„meaningful‟ access to education and confer „some educational benefit‟
upon the child for whom it is designed.” Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238,
247 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 200), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in P.P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 730 (3d Cir.
2009). We have explained that the educational benefit must be more than “trivial,” and
must offer the potential for “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit.” Id.
7

On appeal, the Parents first argue that the District Court erred in rejecting
their claim that Cranbury failed to comply with the IDEA‟s procedural requirements in
several respects. The District Court found that the Parents had waived these procedural
challenges by failing to raise them before the ALJ. See David D. v. Dartmouth Sch.
Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 424 (1st Cir. 1985). The Parents do not challenge this finding in
their opening brief. Therefore, any such challenge has been waived. See Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).3
Next, the Parents argue that the District Court erred in determining that the
proposed IEP was “reasonably calculated to enable [B.S.] to receive educational
benefits.” See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. Specifically, the Parents claim that the IEP was
inappropriate because: (1) B.S. functions as a much younger child in a number of critical
social, academic, and vocational areas; (2) the 2009-2010 IEP does not include special
instruction individually designed for B.S.; (3) the IEP is not based on peer-reviewed
research; (4) Princeton High School has numerous “areas of need” regarding its ability to

3

In any event, we agree with the District Court that the alleged procedural violations are
either substantive in nature (and addressed below) or without merit. See D.S. v. Bayonne
Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that a procedural violation is
actionable under the IDEA only if it results in a loss of educational opportunity for the
student, seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or causes a deprivation of
educational benefits). With respect to the Parents‟ argument that the District Court
inappropriately placed the burden of proof on them when it stated that they had “not
demonstrated that Cranbury failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the
IDEA,” (DA22), we note that the District Court was referring to their burden in that
court, not their burden at the administrative hearing.
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provide a FAPE; and (5) Cranbury failed to provide an ESY for the 2009 summer. After
reviewing the relevant portions of the record, we perceive no error in the District Court‟s
resolution of these claims.
First, the District Court found that, contrary to the Parents‟ contention, the
evidence indicated that B.S. would succeed at Princeton with accommodations and
modifications similar to those he received at Cranbury. We see no error in this regard.
As the court explained, although the record contains evidence that B.S. functions as a
younger child in several respects, the weight of the evidence suggests that he performed
well at Cranbury with accommodations and modifications, that he thrives on cognitive
challenges, and that he would benefit from matriculating with his peers. Furthermore, to
the extent that the Parents rely on Dr. Kay‟s opinion that the Lewis School would be a
better fit for B.S., we note that the District Court properly afforded due deference to the
ALJ‟s finding that Dr. Kay‟s report contained “too many deficiencies” to be given “too
much weight under the circumstances.” (DA133); D.S., 602 F.3d at 564 (“[A] District
Court must accept the state agency‟s credibility determinations unless non-testimonial,
extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion.”) (internal quotation
marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).
Next, we discern no error in the District Court‟s conclusion that the 20092010 IEP was appropriate insofar as it included special instruction individually designed
for B.S. The District Court found that the IEP addressed B.S.‟s unique needs by
providing: (a) a list of goals and objective for B.S.; (2) classroom modifications such as
9

preferential seating, chunking of material, use of computers, use of spell check on a
computer, and extra time for assignments; (3) supplementary aids; (4) mainstream classes
in areas in which B.S. excels and pullout classes in areas in which he needs improvement;
(5) speech-language services related to his replacement English class; (6) adaptive
physical education; (7) a weekly social skills group; (8) physical therapy once a month;
and (9) a one-to-one aide to assist B.S. during transition periods, to help with
organizational skills, and to facilitate social interactions with his peers. The record
supports the District Court‟s conclusion.
The Parents also argue that the IEP violated the IDEA by failing to include
methods of instruction based on peer-review research in accordance with 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d), which provides that an IEP must include “a statement of the special education
and related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed
research to the extent practicable.” Specifically, the Parents complain that the IEP should
have included the Wilson Fluency program, a peer-reviewed method of instruction
recommended by Dr. Kay. We agree with the District Court, however, that, given the
ALJ‟s credibility determination, the IEP did not violate the Act by failing to incorporate
all of Dr. Kay‟s recommended methods of instruction.
We also agree with the District Court that the record supports the ALJ‟s
conclusion that Princeton High School‟s 2004 self-assessment does not demonstrate that
the school is unable to provide a FAPE to B.S. Although the Parents argue that the selfassessment identifies several “areas of need”—such as understaffing in speech and
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language—the ALJ found that it was too old to be given “any reasonable or relevant
consideration.” (DA134.) The ALJ went on to note that he had “not been provided with
any timely New Jersey State educational mandate or directive which would have cited
Princeton High School with any relevant or timely deficiencies.” (Id.) In light of this
record, we agree with the District Court and the ALJ that the 2004 self-assessment does
not demonstrate that Princeton High School is unable to provide a FAPE to B.S.
Lastly, the Parents argue that the IEP was inappropriate because it failed to
provide B.S. with an ESY for the summer of 2009. According to the ALJ, however,
while the initial IEP did not contain an ESY placement, the IEP was eventually amended
to provide for a summer program, and Cranbury in fact attempted to place B.S. in an ESY
at Princeton High School for the summer of 2009. We have reviewed the record and
conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in affirming this finding.
Because the District Court did not err in concluding that the IEP was
appropriate and “reasonably calculated to enable [B.S.] to receive educational benefits,”
see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, the Parents were not entitled to reimbursement for
unilaterally placing their son at the Lewis School, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).4

4

On appeal, the Parents argue that the District Court should have deemed their Statement
of Facts undisputed pursuant to New Jersey Local Civil Rule 56.1 because Cranbury
failed to respond to the Parents‟ submission. See D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 56.1(a) (requiring the
non-moving party to furnish “a responsive statement of material facts, addressing each
paragraph of the movant‟s statement, indicating agreement or disagreement,” and
providing that “any material fact not disputed shall be deemed undisputed”). It appears,
however, that the District Court excused Cranbury‟s failure to strictly comply with Rule
56.1(a), and relied instead on Cranbury‟s Statement of Undisputed Facts to adjudicate the
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III.
We have reviewed the Parents‟ remaining arguments and conclude that they
are without merit. Accordingly, we will affirm.

cross-motions.
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